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I. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration is a quasi-judicial system with flexible procedural 
rules and largely private proceedings used as an alternative to 
litigation.1 Pre-dispute arbitration is the contractual agreement to 
arbitrate a dispute before said dispute arises between parties; pre-
dispute arbitration is the type of dispute resolution commonly seen 
in employment contracts. An agreement to arbitrate may be found 
in an employment agreement signed by the employee, but the 
agreement is sometimes buried somewhere within other hiring 
documents. Alternatively, the arbitration agreement might be found 
in the application for employment or the employee handbook. The 
negative effects that arbitration has on employees’ rights is a public 
policy concern that many businesses ought to closely examine 
before utilizing the practice with increasing regularity.  
While Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act2  necessitates 
enforcement of arbitration agreements in maritime transactions and 
contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” the clear-
cut scope of ‘transactions involving commerce’ has not always been 
certain.3  
Since the 1991 Supreme Court decision of Gilmer v. Interstate/ 
Johnson Lane, courts in this country have almost uniformly upheld 
enforcement of employment arbitration clauses in the United 
 
1.  Jean Murray, The Benefits and Drawbacks of Arbitration, THE 
BALANCE: SMALL BUSINESS (July 22, 2019), 
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/what-are-the-benefits-and-drawbacks-of-
arbitration-398535; Arbitration, WEX, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex. 
2.  [Hereinafter FAA]. 
3.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2019); Jon O. Shimabukuro and Jennifer A. Staman, Cong. 
Research Serv., R44960, Mandatory Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act 
(2017).  
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States.4 Gilmer represented, for the first time, that a statutory civil 
rights claim may be subjected to mandatory arbitration.5 
Before 1995, there was a split among U.S. courts interpreting 
Section 2, with some courts concluding that the FAA applied only 
to those contracts where both parties contemplated an interstate 
connection. 6  Then, in 1995, the Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, held in a 7-2 opinion that the 
phrase “involving commerce” entails a full exercise of Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause.7 
Following these decisions, in 2001, the Court affirmed that the 
FAA covers employment disputes that require arbitration to resolve 
work-related disputes.8 In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the 
Court held that an employment application which included a 
mandatory arbitration provision was not excluded from the FAA’s 
coverage following the statute’s exemption clause.9 
Since the broadening of “transactions involving commerce” 
under Section 2 of the FAA, arbitration practice has been touted as 
being cost-effective, time efficient, and confidential. 10  With the 
FAA continually preempting any state statute that conflicts in any 
way with arbitration, it is very likely that an arbitration clause in an 
employment contract will be binding on the employee, thus shutting 
out the individual’s constitutional access to the court system due to 
the employee signing a contractual waiver within an employment 
contract.11 
Section 2 of the FAA specifically states that agreements for 
arbitration are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
 
4.  Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, 
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-
access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-american-
workers/; Gilmer v. Interstate/ Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 38 (1991) 
(holding the existence of a manifest liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements). 
5.  Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: 
A Public Policy Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173 (1998). 
6.  Id. at 189.  
7.  Shimabukuro, supra note 3; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995). 
8.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001); 
Shimabukuro, supra note 3; Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995). 
9.  Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 109 (2001). 
10.  Id.; Agreement: Mediation and Arbitration Agreement, SHRM (May 3, 
2017), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-
forms/pages/mediationandarbitrationagreement.aspx (displaying sample 
employment arbitration agreements typically found in employment contracts); 9 
U.S.C. § 2 (2019).  
11.  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); See also Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 684 So. 2d 102, 106 (Ala. 1995). 
3
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grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
written contract. 12  Further, arbitration clauses themselves are 
severable from the entirety of the contract, so if the employment 
contract itself is unenforceable, it is very likely that the arbitration 
clause will still be enforceable.13  
Empirical evidence shows us that judges in the U.S. are more 
likely to compel arbitration than to deny enforcing an arbitration 
clause when faced with a motion to compel.14 Thus, it is no surprise 
that businesses and the judicial system favor arbitration as a form of 
alternative dispute resolution to resolve claims efficiently and keep 
them out of the already clogged judicial system.15 
For employees, this prospect is incredibly intimidating. For 
example, in the context of asserting a statutory discrimination claim 
against a corporate employer with extensive bargaining power, it is 
easy to see how an employee might bite the bullet rather than make 
the claim. 
Part I discusses the potential business incentives to use 
arbitration and to include agreements to arbitrate within employee 
contracts. Part II reviews the ethical considerations and drawbacks 
to implementing mandatory arbitration in employment law disputes, 
especially as it pertains to statutory discrimination and harassment 
claims. Part III includes considerations for businesses when 
confronted with the decision to include an arbitration agreement in 
employment contracts, as well as some guidelines for drafting 
arbitration clauses to mitigate policy concerns. The analysis 
concludes with a discussion of best practices for businesses to 
consider when they decide to include arbitration clauses in their 
employment contracts, in light of the benefits and ethical 
considerations in the advent of the #MeToo movement.16 
 
12.   Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casorotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that the 
Montana statute at issue was in direct conflict with the FAA, thus the Montana 
law was preempted by federal law), See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2019). 
13.  Amy Endicott, et al., United States: Arbitration, THE LEGAL 500 & THE 
IN-HOUSE LAWYER: COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE (2017), 
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/11/comparativ
e-legal-guide-united-states-arbitration. 
14.  Robert Gebeloff et al., Removing the Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 
2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/30/business/dealbook/arbitration-
trends.html. 
15.  Roger Haydock et al., Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An 
American Historical Review and a Proposal for a Private/Arbitral and Public/ 
Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 141,145 (2002). 
16.  History & Vision, ME TOO, https://metoomvmt.org/about/ (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2020) (describing that the #MeToo movement started in 2006 as a grass 
roots movement to help young women and girls, particularly Black women and 
girls, who are survivors of sexual violence; after the spread of the #MeToo 
movement on Twitter, the movement began a universal conversation about the 
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II. BUSINESS INCENTIVES FOR USING MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
Given the history of judicial enforceability of arbitration 
agreements in the U.S., it is no wonder many corporations and 
businesses use the clauses to their advantage.17 
A. Epic Systems Framework 
In the 2018 case, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that employment agreements that require employees to 
arbitrate disputes individually do not violate the National Labor 
Relations Act.18 The Court held that nothing in the National Labor 
Relations Act19 guaranteed class and collective action procedures.20 
The majority in Epic Systems agreed that the Congressional intent 
of the NLRA appeared to be the desire to create equality of 
bargaining power in the workplace between employees and 
management by protecting the right to unionize and engage in 
collective bargaining.21 
Some have seen the Epic Systems ruling as yet another 
illustration of the decreasing power of employees in the U.S. 
political system.22 Others, including many businesses who utilize 
arbitration agreements, viewed the Court’s decision in Epic Systems 
as a return to the freedom of contract in employment law.23 
The Epic Systems rule makes it far more likely that employees 
simply will not pursue low-value claims or individual claims in 
general.24 The practical result is incredibly beneficial to employers 
 
fight for women, girls, and trans individuals to experience a life free of prevalent 
sexual and domestic violence).   
17.  Are Employee Arbitration Agreements Right for You? Some Pros and 
Cons to Consider, STOEL RIVES, LLP (June 6, 2018), 
https://www.stoel.com/legal-insights/legal-updates/are-employee-arbitration-
agreements-right-for-you. 
18.  Id; Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629 (2018). 
19.  [Hereinafter NLRA]. 
20.  Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct., at 1629 (2018).  
21.  Benjamin Robbins, Symposium: The Federal Arbitration Act and the 
National Labor Relations Act are Two Ships That Pass in the Night, 
SCOTUSBLOG (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/05/symposium-the-federal-arbitration-act-
and-the-national-labor-relations-act-are-two-ships-that-pass-in-the-night/. 
22.  Case Comment, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 427, 
427 (2018). 
23.  Charlotte Garden, Epic Systems v. Lewis: The Return of Freedom of 
Contract in Work Law, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acs-
supreme-court-review/epic-systems-v-lewis-the-return-of-freedom-of-contract-
in-work-law/. 
24.  Id; Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. 1612,1624 (2018) (“Seeking to demonstrate 
an irreconcilable statutory conflict . . . the employees point to Section 7 of the 
NLRA. That provision guarantees workers ‘the right to self-organization, to form, 
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who wish to be virtually immune from claims brought by their 
employees.25 
Mandatory arbitration procedures allow employers to require all 
non-unionized employees to agree, as a condition of employment, 
that any individual statutory claims or other litigable claims will be 
governed by private arbitration rather than through the public court 
system. 26  Once the substantive and procedural differences of 
arbitration are understood, it is fairly simple to see why many 
employers choose the privacy and speed of arbitration over the 
publicity and comparative difficulty of litigating the same claims.27 
B. Privacy 
First, there is significant employer and employee privacy in 
arbitration, and many companies prefer arbitration based on this fact 
alone.28 Open court proceedings may expose corporate misconduct 
directly on the public record; in contrast, via arbitration, 
corporations can protect their reputation to an extent and keep 
potential wrongdoings private and out of the public view.29 
The process does not allow complete privacy, but rather a 
heightened level of privacy as compared to open court 
proceedings. 30  Employment arbitration in the United States is 
private, rather than completely confidential in nature.31 While the 
public cannot attend an arbitration hearing, and arbitrators and 
administrators are precluded from disclosing any information about 
 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing. . .’ From this language, the employees ask us to infer a 
clear and manifest congressional command to displace the Arbitration Act and 
outlaw agreements like theirs. Section 7 focuses on the right to organize unions 
and bargain collectively. It may permit unions to prohibit arbitration. . . But it 
does not express approval or disapproval of arbitration. It does not mention class 
or collective action procedures. It does not even hint at a wish to displace the 
Arbitration Act- let alone accomplish that much clearly and manifestly, as our 
precedents demand.”) 
25.  Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1629 (2018). 
26. Alexander Colvin, et al., Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in 
the United States: Actors and Outcomes, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV., 68(5), 
1019, 1020 (2015). 
27.  E. Norman Veasey, The Conundrum of the Arbitration vs. Litigation 
Decision, AM. BAR ASS’N. (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2015/12/07_
veasey/. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Christopher R. Drahozal, Confidentiality in Consumer and Employment 
Arbitration, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 28, 29 (2015) (quoting Myriam Gilles, 
The Demise of Deterrence: Mandatory Arbitration and the “Litigation Forum” 
Movement 17 (2014)) (paper presented to the State Appellate Court Judges at 
Pound Civil Justice Institute 2014 Forum). 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
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the arbitration, the parties are free to disclose any information, 
unless a non-disclosure agreement binds them as part of the 
agreement to arbitrate.32 
Further, the parties would need to publicly disclose an 
arbitration award when the party seeks to enforce an arbitration 
award in court.33 Most courts throughout the U.S. will refuse to issue 
an award where the award is under seal, so the award on which the 
court relies will typically need to remain public. 34  
The privacy of arbitration guarantees considerably less negative 
media attention to companies as a result of potentially damaging 
claims such as sexual harassment or whistleblower claims.35 It is 
clear, then, that arbitration serves as an incredible benefit for 
businesses who wish to preserve their public image or have already 
been entrenched in media displays and desire a way to quickly and 
quietly settle their employee disputes.36  
As an example, Dov Charney, the founder of American Apparel, 
kept countless corporate misgivings out of the public eye by 
requiring employees to sign arbitration and confidentiality 
agreements.37 Investors in American Apparel, as well as the public, 
were kept in the dark for years concerning the allegations of sexual 
harassment against Charney.38 The board of American Apparel was 
aggressive about using arbitration clauses to the advantage of the 
company. The allegations against Charney would likely have 
become known to the public much earlier had it not been for 
requiring employees to enter arbitration and requiring those same 
employees to sign confidentiality agreements regarding any 
settlement reached. 39  Some argue that without arbitration 
agreements, American Apparel models’ sexual harassment 
allegations against Charney would have been released earlier.40  
Those critiquing arbitration clauses argue the confidentiality 
provisions instituted by the company were the actual mechanisms 
used to silence the employees. 41  Regardless of which legal 
 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Dennis J. Alessi, Arbitration of Employment Disputes? Let’s Have 
Another Look!, PRIMERUS, https://www.primerus.com/business-law-
articles/arbitration-of-employment-disputes-lets-have-another-look-
10152013.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). 
36.  Id. 
37.  Steven Solomon, Arbitration Clauses Let American Apparel Hide 
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 15, 2014), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/arbitration-clauses-let-american-
apparel-hide-misconduct/. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Drahozal, supra note 29, at 31. 
41.  Id. 
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mechanism controlled the outcome, arbitration along with 
confidentiality provisions allowed the corporation to take more time 
internally to probe the allegations before the board ultimately 
decided to oust Charney. 42  While controversial, arbitration 
confidentiality may be beneficial for companies and corporations 
who want to buy time for their in-house legal counsel to investigate 
alleged misconduct and allow their lawyers to address the issue 
internally before the public catches wind, with the resulting 
publicity ultimately negatively affecting sales or revenue.  
Businesses often have an interest in keeping arbitration 
outcomes confidential for a number of reasons: to protect secret 
commercial or scientific information, to protect the company’s 
reputation, to avoid revelation of certain business strategies, and to 
not upset customers with a public display of problems with an 
employee or group of employees.43 
C. Providing a Realistic Path for Employees 
Another incentive for arbitration in the business employment 
law context is that without employment arbitration, many claims 
filed by employees would not attract the attention of private lawyers 
because the stakes are too small, and outcomes may be uncertain.44  
Many plaintiffs’ attorneys are incredibly selective about the 
cases they choose to take on due to the unpredictability of jury 
awards and the difficulty of facing a corporate or big business 
adversary.45 As a result, without arbitration, many employee claims 
would be filed with administrative agencies that ultimately often do 
not have the resources to litigate for the employee.46 For example, 
in order for employees to file a discrimination lawsuit against their 
employer, they must first file an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) claim and then obtain a right to sue letter; 
however, a similar requirement does not exist for most private 
arbitration proceedings.47 
 
42.  Andrea Chang & Shan Li, American Apparel Says Misconduct Led to 
Founder Dov Charney’s Ouster, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2014), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-0619-american-apparel-20140619-
story.html. 
43.  Veasey, supra note 27. 
44.  Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 559, 
563-566 (2001); see also, Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination 
Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 556, 556-75 (2001). 
45.  Id. at 563 
46.  Id. 
47.  Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Must an Employee File an EEOC Discrimination 
Charge Before a Lawsuit?, SHRM (Apr. 26, 2019), 
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-
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The EEOC,48 for example, is so backlogged and underfunded 
that it has begun closing cases without even investigating them.49 
Part of this is due to the fact that since the 1980s, the U.S. workforce 
has grown by fifty percent, yet Congress has kept the EEOC’s 
funding relatively  flat.50 Administrative agencies are proving to be 
a difficult place for employees to bring their claims and to litigate 
them.51 A study by Lex Machina shows that from January 2009 
through July 2017, of the 54,810 federal employment discrimination 
and harassment cases that were filed and closed, employees who 
brought suit won only 584 times in trial (roughly one percent total), 
while employers won 7,518 of those cases (about fourteen percent), 
and another 3,883 of those cases were settled on procedural grounds, 
many dismissing the employees’ claims.52 
 The employees that are most likely to obtain a more desirable 
settlement from a strictly litigation-based system are those who are 
represented by competent, often high-paid, counsel.53 Employees 
who elect to represent themselves in a lawsuit against a business or 
those who retain less-than-desirable counsel will be faced with an 
unpredictable litigation proceeding and jury trial against a business 
with tremendous bargaining power in the same arena.54 Even if the 
employee does get the employment case to the jury, the cases are 
often still very hard to prove.  
 
law/pages/must-an-employee-file-an-eeoc-discrimination-charge-before-a-
lawsuit.aspx; [hereinafter EEOC]; see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 122 S. 
Ct. 754 (2002) (holding that an agreement between a private employer and 
employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes does not bar EEOC from 
pursuing victim-specific judicial relief in enforcement action alleging that 
employer violated Americans with Disabilities Act); EEOC NOTICE: NUMBER 
915-060, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (Aug. 29, 1990), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arbitration-age.cfm (Reiterating the fact 
that while an individual may agree to arbitration, they may not be coerced into 
arbitration, and despite an arbitration agreement, the employee retains the ability 
to file a discrimination claim against their employer via the EEOC. The 
Commission takes the position that ADEA claims, for example, cannot be waived 
by arbitration). 
48.  Id. 
49.  Maryam Jameel, More and More Workplace Discrimination Cases are 
Being Closed Before They’re Even Investigated, VOX (June 14, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/6/14/18663296/congress-eeoc-workplace-
discrimination. 
50.  Sean Captain, Workers Win Only 1% of Federal Civil Rights Lawsuits at 
Trial, FAST COMPANY (July 31, 2017), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/40440310/employees-win-very-few-civil-rights-
lawsuits. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. (likely settlement of claims making up the remaining 78% of claims). 
53.  Estreicher, supra note 44, at 563; see also, Selmi, supra note 44, at 556. 
54.  Id. 
9
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D. No Jury Trial 
Arbitration guarantees the lack of a jury trial, which can be 
extremely beneficial for companies. Additionally, arbitration 
proceedings rarely award punitive damages.55  
For example, New York Courts held in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, 
Inc., that the judiciary is better equipped than arbitrators to 
determine punitive damages.56 Garrity held that an arbitrator has no 
power to award punitive damages, even if the parties agree, and that 
damages of this sort are reserved to the courts as a matter of public 
policy.57 
Further, limiting employee access to the courts via arbitration 
allows employers to decrease the possibility of a strenuous payout 
to an employee at a jury trial. A recent federal sexual harassment 
jury trial in New York State resulted in a $13 million award against 
the employer, including $11 million in punitive damages under Title 
VII and New York State Human Rights Law.58 Awards like these 
are intimidating to even the most wealthy corporations, and for this 
reason, more employers are reaching for the arbitral forum in their 
employment contracts.  
E. Flexibility 
With the procedural rules of arbitration being governed by 
contract or by the chosen arbitration forum, such as American 
Arbitration Association, businesses are afforded the luxury of being 
able to “shop around” to the extent necessary to find procedural 
arbitration rules which are most favorable to their company and 
interests. Since the ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
even if state law prohibits the arbitration of a particular claim, the 
FAA preempts this law, so therefore the claim is arbitrable despite 
the conflicting state law. 59  This decision makes it relatively 
effortless for businesses to creatively craft employment arbitration 
 
55.  James Hadden, The Authority of Arbitrators to Award Punitive 
Damages: Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business System, 7 OHIO ST. J. DIS. RES. 
337-350 (1992); see also Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 793 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1976). 
56.  Id.  
57.  Id. 
58.  Eric Bachman, $13 Million Awarded in Sexual Harassment Jury Trial, 
ZUCKERMAN LAW (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.zuckermanlaw.com/glass-ceiling-
discrimination-law-blog/13-million-awarded-sexual-harassment-jury-trial/; see 
also Mayo-Coleman v. Am. Sugar Holding, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94164, 
at *1-7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015). 
59.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011); see also 
Jon Berkelhammer, Arbitration: A Comparison of the Pros and Cons, ELLIS & 
WINTERS LLP (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.elliswinters.com/updates/arbitration-a-
comparison-of-the-pros-and-cons#_ftn1. 
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agreements and rarely have them disturbed. The parties (and 
typically the business, since they’re crafting the employment 
agreement) have the freedom to define what claims will be 
arbitrated, when they will be arbitrated, and how the process will 
proceed.60 
Further, the procedural flexibility of arbitration allows company 
executives to be more easily accommodated since the public court 
system often has busy calendars and is often stacked with cases.61 In 
the public court system, the attorneys, plaintiffs and defendants are 
often at the mercy of the judge’s discretion as far as how the case 
will proceed and what the schedule will look like. Arbitration allows 
corporations to choose the location, timing, and rules governing 
each proceeding.  
F. Limited Appeal 
Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements “shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”62  
And under Section 10 of the FAA, an arbitration award can only 
be vacated: (1) where the award was procured by fraud; (2) where 
there was partiality or corruption evident in any of the arbitrators; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing for sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to 
hear evidence material to a controversy; or another misbehavior by 
which the rights of a party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them 
that a mutual, final, and definite award was not made.63  
Thus, when courts do review arbitration awards by employers, 
they will not vacate an award for simple errors in judgment or 
mistakes of law: the errors must be truly significant and apparent on 
 
60.  Id. 
61.  Veasey, supra note 27. 
62.  Validity, Irrevocability, and Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate of 
2019, 9 U.S.C.S. § 2 (2019). (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through Public Law 
116056, approved Aug. 23, 2019) (“A written provision in maritime transaction 
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal 
to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to 
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or 
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”); see also, Beth Rowe, 
COMMENT: Binding Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Opposing Pre-
Dispute Agreements, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 921, 924 (1996). 
63.  Hon. Fred Foreman, et al., To Arbitrate or to Not Arbitrate- That is the 
Question, ILL. ST. B. ASS’N: BENCH & B. (June 2017), 
https://www.isba.org/sections/bench/newsletter/2017/06/toarbitrateortonotarbitra
tethatisth. 
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the face of the award.64 This is a high threshold. It is because of this 
high threshold that arbitration awards are rarely disturbed. 65 
Arbitration awards are also rarely disturbed based on the Supreme 
Court’s policy liberally favoring arbitration agreements.66 
Errors of fact or law are insufficient to vacate an award; this is 
likely due to the very nature of binding arbitration, and how it differs 
from other forms of ADR because, similar to litigation, arbitration 
is an adjudicatory process where the arbitrator’s decision is binding 
upon the participants.67 The grounds for overturning or vacating an 
arbitrator’s decision are so limited that they essentially deny parties 
the right to an appeal.68 
G. No Requirement for Reasoned Award 
Another advantage is the lack of a written opinion, which 
contributes to the confidentiality aspect discussed above. 69 
Arbitrators are free to issue arbitration awards without ever issuing 
a written opinion, furthering the veil of secrecy favorable to the 
defendant.70 Even if a party desires a written transcript, they may be 
difficult, if not impossible to acquire.71 
H. Legislation Protecting Confidentiality 
Arkansas, California, Missouri, and Texas have legislated 
specific statutory protection for arbitration communications.72  In 
other states, case law provides similar confidentiality protection.73 
In states with legislation and case law designed to protect the 
confidentiality of arbitration proceedings, courts are more likely to 
 
64.  Id. 
65.  David Taylor, Using Binding Arbitration to Resolve Construction 
Disputes, BRADLEY (Oct. 2, 2014), 
https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2014/10/david-taylor-using-
binding-arbitration-to-resolv. 
66.  Foreman, supra note 63. 
67.  Rowe, supra note 62, at 924.  
68.  Id. at 936. 
69.  Id. at 938. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Kathryn Miller, Issues in Arbitration of Employment Cases, MLC 
GROUP P.C. (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.mlgrouppc.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Issues-in-Arbitration-of-Employment-Cases.pdf 
(describing how according to AAA rules, the party requesting a transcript is 
required to pay all fees associated with the transcript). 
72.  Laura Kaster, Confidentiality in U.S. Arbitration, 5. N.Y. DISP. RES. 
LAW. 23, 25 (2012). 
73.  Id; Bjc Health Sys. v. Grp. Health Plan, 30 S.W.3d 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2000) (holding that “no admission, representation, statement, or other confidential 
communication made in setting up or conducting such [arbitration] proceedings 
not otherwise discoverable or obtainable shall be admissible as evidence or 
subject to discovery” based on the Missouri statute). 
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be favorably disposed to parties seeking relief from the production 
of arbitration documents within discovery. 74  Given the differing 
levels of support that state jurisdictions have regarding arbitration, 
the choice of law provision in an arbitration agreement can be 
drafted strategically.  
I. Speed 
Together, the procedural differences of arbitration and litigation 
often allow the arbitration process to resolve a dispute with more 
economy than the litigation process. Litigation of an employee 
claims, including appeals, could extend upwards of eight years, 
whereas the Institute for Civil Justice of the Rand Corporation found 
that the average arbitration decision is reached in approximately 8.6 
months.75 
Moreover, allowing flexibility in the procedural schedule of 
arbitration means that businesses have more time to focus on the 
ordinary course of business, as opposed to defending against 
employee discrimination claims. The flexibility of arbitration may 
also mean that the business can allocate more time and resources to 
decreasing the likelihood that an employee will bring discrimination 
or harassment claims. Additional funds could be allocated to the 
human resources or legal department to ensure that the business is 
complying with federal statutory discrimination claims and ensuring 
that other employees and supervisors are educated on the internal 
and legal repercussions of discriminating against or harassing other 
employees.   
J. Predictability 
Further, given the legal climate in the years since Gilmer and 
progeny, more corporate counsel and businesses are mandating 
employment arbitration upon the assurance that the courts will 
enforce the arbitration agreement if a motion to compel is brought.76 
 
74.  Kaster, supra note 72, at 25. 
75.  Rowe, supra note 62, at 934; see also, Gary G. Mathiason & Pavneet 
Singh Uppal, Evaluating and Using Employer-Initiated Arbitration Policies and 
Agreements: Preparing the Workplace for the Twenty-First Century, C902 ALI-
ABA 875, 894 (1994) (citing a Civil Justice study by the Rand Corporation’s 
institute finding that the average processing time from complaint to decision in 
arbitration is about 8.6 months along with 20% cost savings to respective parties). 
76.  Charles Coleman, Is Mandatory Arbitration Living Up to Its 
Expectations? A View from the Employer’s Perspective, AM. B. ASS’N: 
ALTERNATIVE DISP. RESOL. (June 4, 2018), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-
annualcle/09/materials/data/papers/015.pdf; Gilmer v. Interstate/ Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that a claim under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.S. § 621 et seq., could be subjected to binding, 
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Employers are comfortable mandating arbitration in employment 
contracts with employees, as it has become apparent that the law and 
the FAA protect arbitration agreements entered into by employers 
outside of the transportation industry.77 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
restated its approval of mandatory employment arbitration more 
recently in Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, holding that a collective-
bargaining agreement entered into by union members mandating 
arbitration was fully enforceable under federal law even where the 
union members alleged age discrimination under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.78 
Another procedural advantage which enhances the speed of 
arbitration proceedings is that arbitrators are not generally required 
to “find facts” in the traditional judicial sense, justify awards, or 
even describe the process by which they arrived at their decisions.79 
K. An Effective Disincentive to Bring Claims 
Finally, the last consideration in the inclusion of mandatory 
arbitration provisions is the potential advantage to corporate 
counsel. Top corporations such as NCR, AT&T, U.S. West, Bank of 
America, and Chevron will evaluate lawyers and contract managers 
on the basis of how many disputes were avoided, what costs were 
saved, and the creation of solutions intended to preserve existing 
business relationships as opposed to evaluating based on an 
attorney’s record of lawsuits won.80 It is clear to see why corporate 
counsel would recommend incorporation of mandatory arbitration 
on employees, to the extent that the law allows it.81 
Each year, some sixty million American employees will enter 
into mandatory arbitration provisions with their employers; of that 
number, approximately 6,000 employment arbitration cases are 
filed.82 Thus, only one in about 10,400 employees subject to binding 
arbitration actually will file a claim under the procedures each 
year.83  New York University of Law Professor Cynthia Estlund 
 
compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities 
registration application); Circuit City (holding that a contract of adhesion, or 
standard-form contract, drafted by the employer with superior bargaining power  
which doesn’t allow the party to modify the agreement whatsoever, and as a 
prerequisite for the job was procedurally unconscionable). 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id.; 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009). 
79.  Rowe, supra note 62, at 933. 
80.  Todd Carver & Albert Vondra, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why it 
Doesn’t Work and Why it Does, HARV. BUS. REV. (May-June 1994), 
https://hbr.org/1994/05/alternative-dispute-resolution-why-it-doesnt-work-and-
why-it-does). 
81.  Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. 
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compared arbitration filing rates to employment case filing rates in 
federal and state court and found that if employees bound by 
mandatory arbitration filed claims at the same rate as in court, there 
would be anywhere from 206,000 to 468,000 claims filed annually, 
or thirty-five to eighty times the current actual rate of claims filed 
by employees subject to binding arbitration.84 
With the obvious effect of binding mandatory arbitration 
keeping employee discrimination and harassment claims from being 
brought, corporate attorneys are celebrated for utilizing ADR 
policies that have the effect of lessening the amount of litigation a 
company is faced with.85 However, binding mandatory arbitration is 
criticized in this nation for being contrary to public policy concerns 
relative to worker’s rights in this nation; it is nonetheless clear that 
as a form of self-preservation, many attorneys in the corporate 
context will advocate for the procedure as a claim-limiting 
mechanism. 
 Discussion of the business benefits of mandatory employment 
arbitration discussed throughout this section are, of course, non-
exhaustive; arguably, there are other benefits specific to individual 
companies, depending in large part on their industry and the type of 
employee disputes that are typically brought within that industry.  
The predictability, uniformity, flexibility, privacy, relative ease, 
favorable legal environment, avoidance of jury trial, limited appeal, 
and disincentive of litigation are all factors that make arbitration an 
easy choice for many businesses. However, in the wake of the 
#MeToo movement and other public policy concerns, many 
companies may want to take a close look at their binding arbitration 
employment procedures and reevaluate if and how to implement 
these clauses in employment contracts.  
III. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DRAWBACKS OF COMPANY 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 
This section discusses some of the ethical and public policy 
concerns of implementing mandatory arbitration agreements as they 
relate to employees. Business ethics and public policy in recent 
years have been increasingly intertwined. 86  In the wake of the 
 
84.  Id; Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. 
L. REV. 679, 689-694 (2018) (comparing arbitration claims filed to federal and 
state court filing numbers). 
85.  John Allison, Five Ways to Keep Disputes Out of Court, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Jan.-Feb. 1990), https://hbr.org/1990/01/five-ways-to-keep-disputes-out-
of-court. 
86.  Jenny Abel, Strategy Beyond Markets: The Intersection of Business, 
Public Policy and Ethics, UVA DARDEN: IDEAS TO ACTION (Mar. 23, 2017), 
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#MeToo movement, for example, businesses have rushed to ensure 
they comply with Title IX and other federal laws.87 As a contextual 
example, Kate Upton accused Guess co-founder Paul Marciano of 
sexual harassment on Twitter and within hours after her tweet, 
Guess’ company shares dropped almost eighteen percent.88 These 
facts alone demonstrate that claims against a company’s public 
image or corporate officers often damage the company 
reputationally and financially, sometimes irreparably.89 
 Non-market pressures, such as public policy and media 
coverage, can have just as immense of an effect on a company’s 
brand as can core business issues such as supply and demand.90 
Perhaps more so now than ever, businesses are engaging in more 
transparent practices and increasing their online presence in a 
variety of new ways, such as social media, in order to retain their 
markets and increase business.91 
With so many businesses acutely aware of and impacted by their 
public image and reputation, and so many employees increasingly 
critical and aware of their employer’s core ethical system, 
businesses would be wise to urgently consider public policy 
concerns posed by binding arbitration. 
A. Corporations Begin Limiting Arbitration in Response to 
Employee Demands 
Some companies are finding themselves involved in public 
scandals related to mandatory arbitration.92  In 2019, Google became 
 
https://ideas.darden.virginia.edu/strategy-beyond-markets-the-intersection-of-
business-public-policy-and-ethics (discussing the nonmarket forces such as 
human rights, government regulation, environmental activism, and other special 
interests group which have created a need for businesses to develop a different 
and proactive approach to these pressures and factors). 
87.  Sachin Bave, Companies Reopening Old Cases, Seek Legal Opinion 
Fearing #MeToo Blow, ECON. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/company/corporate-
tends/companies-reopening-old-cases-seek-legal-opinion-fearing-metoo-
blow/articleshow/66157.cms?from=mdr (discussing how many corporations are 
revisiting cases and interviewing women in each department to discuss any sexual 
harassment that is or may have taken place within the workplace). 
88.  Samantha Cooney, Companies are Losing Millions After #MeToo 
Allegations Like Kate Upton’s Claim Against Guess’ Paul Marciano, TIME (Feb. 
2, 2018), https://time.com/5130340/kate-upton-guess-stock-price/. 
89.  Robert Eccles et al., Reputation and Its Risks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 
2007), https://hbr.org/2007/02/reputation-and-its-risks. 
90.  See Abel, supra note 86. 
91.  See David S. Sherwyn & J. Bruce Tracey, Mandatory Arbitration of 
Employment Disputes: Implications for Policy and Practice, 42(5) CORNELL 
HOTEL & RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q. 60-71 (2001). 
92.  Alexia Campbell, Google Employees Fought for Their Right to Sue the 
Company--and Won, VOX (Feb. 22, 2019), 
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the latest company to end mandatory arbitration for employees in 
response to employee pressure and protests.93  
This decision came after Google decided to end arbitration for 
sexual harassment claims made against Google’s employees in 
2018.94 Google employees demanded a public report on the number 
of sexual harassment complaints made against Google employees 
and the outcomes of those claims. 
 Google responded by declaring it would begin to keep more 
detailed reports of these complaints, the trends thereof, and 
subsequent disciplinary action. 95  Google’s policy response came 
only after employee revolution and protest. This protest was largely 
inevitable when employees began to understand that their 
fundamental constitutional rights, specifically the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial, was potentially being limited by 
their contractual agreement to arbitrate any dispute they may have 
with their employer.96 
B. National Balancing Decision for Judicial Enforceability 
Undoubtedly, the nation’s high court has struggled with “where 
and when” to enforce binding mandatory arbitration against 
employees who have signed these agreements due to a lack of 
employer-employee bargaining power. Thus, a national balancing 
decision has been presented, weighing the benefits of arbitration 
with the public policy issues raised by the practice.  
In Epic Systems, the Supreme Court struggled with the question 
of arbitration enforceability, and the dissent voiced these concerns 
as the more liberal members of the Court have for decades.97 Epic 
Systems was adjudicated in 2018 and added to the litany of pro-
arbitration rulings, holding that an arbitration agreement in an 
employment contract calling for individualized proceedings was to 
 
https://vox.com/technology/2019/2/22/18236172/mandatory-forced-arbitration-
google-employees. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id.; see also Alexia Campbell, Google Announces Changes to Sexual 
Harassment Policies After Global Employee Walkout, VOX (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/11/8/18075840/google-ceo-announces-sexual-
harassment-policy. 
95.  Id. 
96.  Campbell, Google Announces Changes to Sexual Harassment Policies 
After Global Employee Walkout, supra note 94; Edward Brunet, Arbitration and 
Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 81-120 (1992). 
97.  Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); see also Charlotte 
Garden, Epic Systems v. Lewis: The Return of Freedom of Contract in Work Law?, 
AM. CONST. SOC’Y, https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acs-supreme-court-
review/epic-systems-v-lewis-the-return-of-freedom-of-contract-in-work-law/; 
Garrett Epps, An Epic Supreme Court Decision on Employment, THE ATLANTIC 
(May 22, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/an-epic-
supreme-court-decision-on-employment/560963/. 
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be enforced under the FAA because the National Labor Relations 
Act was not in conflict with the FAA; thus, the statutory claim could 
be adjudicated under the arbitration agreement signed.98  
In her dissent, Justice Ginsberg wrote, “[t]he FAA’s legislative 
history also shows that Congress did not intend the statute to apply 
to arbitration provisions in employment contracts.” 99  Ginsberg 
continued, “[t]he inevitable result of today’s decision will be the 
underenforcement of federal and state statutes designed to advance 
the well-being of vulnerable workers.”100 The dissent emphasized 
the lack of mutuality in such agreements, as well as the fact that 
employees are in subordinate positions when compared with their 
large, corporate employers with extensive bargaining power. 101 
There is a resulting unspoken truth stemming from the decision in 
Epic Systems: inevitably, arbitration contacts in employment 
contracts will likely begin to appear with striking regularity.102  
C. Lack of Bargaining Power 
Stevens’s dissent in the Gilmer cases also displays the judicial 
concern for the lack of bargaining power in employee arbitration 
agreements as a matter of policy.103  Stevens’s dissent in Gilmer 
declares: “In my opinion, arbitration clauses contained in 
employment agreements are specifically exempt from coverage of 
the FAA.”104 
Stevens went on to quote the late Justice Burger: 
Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional 
objectives behind a statute seeking to enforce civil 
rights protected by Title VII to allow the very forces 
that had practiced discrimination to contract away 
the right to enforce civil rights in the courts. For 
federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions reached 
by the same combination of forces that had long 
perpetuated invidious discrimination would have 
made the foxes guardians of the chickens.105 
 
98.  Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1627. 
99.  Id. at 1643. 
100.  Id. at 1646. 
101.  Epps, supra note 97. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36-43 (1991) 
(holding that a claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
could be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement 
in a securities registration application). 
104.  Id. at 36. 
105.  Id. at 42. 
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This begs the question: to what extent should courts defer to 
corporate drafters of arbitration agreements meant to be held against 
employees? 106  This unfair bargaining power is reflected in 
ubiquitous take-it-or-leave-it contracts, and corporations will almost 
inevitably forbid their employees from negotiating an arbitration 
clause or forbid them to continue employment without conceding to 
its terms.107 
D. Did the Employee Meaningfully Consent to the Clause? 
The non-consensual nature of arbitration agreements evokes 
another public policy concern.108 This critique stems from the fact 
that many employees do not typically read or understand arbitration 
clauses, and often are not given the option to opt-out of them.109 
Studies show that only a small fraction of adults and employees read 
legal forms and an even smaller percentage understand them.110  
This is problematic given the fact that courts are likely to view 
arbitration clauses as enforceable because the judiciary views them 
almost uniformly as a bargained-for element of the contract.111  
However, many employees lack the legal knowledge and 
background to understand what constitutes arbitration and how their 
assent might limit their rights, making it difficult to view this 
process as an informed decision to consent to arbitration as a matter 
of public policy.112  
This concern has evoked litigation, especially in the tech-age, 
however, courts continue to favor arbitration as well as the notion 
that effective notice was given, even on a cell phone screen.113 In 
 
106.  Jeffrey Salas, Unequal Bargaining Power: Navigating Arbitration 
Clauses, WIS. LAW., 
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx
?Volume=87&Issue=10&ArticleID=23654; see also Michael Green, Opposing 
Excessive Use of Employer Bargaining Power in Mandatory Arbitration 
Agreements Through Collective Employee Actions, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 
77, 80-84 (2003). 
107.  Imre Szalai et al., The Widespread Use of Workplace Arbitration Among 
America’s Top 100 Companies, THE EMP. RTS. ADVOC. INST. (Mar. 2018), 
http://employeerightsadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NELA-
Institute-Report-Widespread-Use-of-Workplace-Arbitration-March-2018.pdf. 
108.  Marsha Levinson, Note, Mandatory Arbitration: How the Current 
System Perpetuates Sexual Harassment Cultures in the Workplace, 59 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 485, 492 (2019). 
109.  Id.; Alan M. White & Cathy L. Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233 (2002); see also Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for 
New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1039, 1059–60 (1998). 
110.  Id. 
111.  Id.; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). 
112.  Levinson, supra note 108, at 492. 
113.   Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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the 2017 Meyer v. Uber Techs case, the Second Circuit held that an 
electronic “click” will suffice to signify acceptance of contract 
terms, as long as the layout and language of the site gives the user 
reasonable notice that a click will manifest assent to an agreement, 
an arbitration agreement in this case. 114  The court opined that 
despite the fact that Meyer’s assent to arbitration was not express, it 
was “unambiguous in light of the objectively reasonable notice of 
the terms,” and that was enough for him to be bound by the contract 
term of arbitration.115  
Anecdotally, this prompts the question of how often users of 
electronic devices are meaningfully, or even consciously, 
consenting to electronic agreements due to the rapid nature with 
which users click on screens.116 Whether this matters for reasons of 
legality appears to be a moot point as expressed by Meyer, yet it still 
demands consideration from a public policy standpoint.117 
E. Employee Difficulty with Financial and Procedural 
Implications 
Yet another public policy implication for businesses wishing to 
continue or begin to implement binding mandatory arbitration are 
the considerable procedural and financial difficulties faced by 
employees wishing to file a claim. 118  While litigation itself is 
procedurally strenuous, arbitration poses its own, unique difficulties 
for the average worker in the United States.119 When the agreement 
itself is likely to have been drafted by the employer, thus favoring 
the employer in terms of where and how the arbitration will proceed, 
employees must submit to the drafter’s preferences.120 This fact is 
concerning as a matter of public policy because the average 
employee has less revenue to commute across the country for an 
arbitration near corporate headquarters than would the corporation 
itself.  
Further, many arbitration agreements require the employee to 
split the cost of arbitration with the employer, which may lend itself 
 
114.  Id. at 79.  
115.  Id.  
116. Chaelin Ra, Association of Digital Media Use with Subsequent 
Symptoms of Attention-Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder Among Adolescents, JAMA 
(2018), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2687861. 
117.  Meyer, 868 F.3d 66 at 80.  
118.  Sean Captain, Workers Win Only 1% of Federal Civil Rights Lawsuits at 
Trial, FAST COMPANY (July 31, 2017), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/40440310/employees-win-very-few-civil-rights-
lawsuits. 
119.  Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Unaffordable Justice: The High Cost of Mandatory 
Employment Arbitration for the Average Worker, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 39, 
39-68 (2014). 
120.  Id. at 42. 
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to being cost-prohibitive for the average U.S. employee.121 Courts 
are split as to whether arbitral cost-sharing arrangements are valid, 
with some courts enforcing these cost splitting arrangements and 
other courts ruling that the employer alone should pay the costs.122  
Regardless, the filing costs for employees making a claim via 
arbitration is not the only fee involved in the arbitration process, 
especially when you consider high attorney’s fees for employees.123 
These fees, which may or may not be split with the employer or paid 
for by the employer, will also include an arbitrator’s per diem, or 
hourly rate: fees at the beginning of the process and substantial costs 
upon conclusion of the arbitration.124 One estimate showed that the 
average cost of arbitrating an employment claim from start to finish 
was around $20,000.00.125  
F. Employee Unconscious Waiver of Rights 
The next ethical consideration for businesses is the potential 
absence of constitutional rights for employees in private arbitration 
proceedings.126 Especially when viewed from the lens that these 
agreements may not be truly consented to by the employee, many 
critics see forced arbitration in employment as a potential violation 
of the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. 127  This is a 
persuasive argument since, as discussed supra, Section D, many 
adult employees will not read their contract agreements for 
employment and might be signing to terms without understanding 
or fully assenting to having their Seventh Amendment right waived.  
The tension in this argument is found in the fact that businesses 
also have a constitutional right to make contracts.128  In the same 
 
121.  Nagele-Piazza, supra note 119, at 42; see Lorene D. Park, Cost-Based 
Challenge to Arbitration Fails, WOLTERS KLUWER: EMP. L. DAILY, 
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/employees-cost-based-
challenge-to-arbitration-fails/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). 
122.  John Crawford, Going Dutch: Should Employees Have to Split the Costs 
of Arbitration in Disputes Arising from Mandatory Arbitration Agreements- 
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 280 (2004). 
123.  Nagele-Piazza, supra note 119, at 45 (indicating the fee cost via the 
American Arbitration Association is often around $200 compared to the $350 
filing fee in federal court). 
124.  Id. at 46. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Kimberly J. Mann, Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Court-
Ordered Arbitration, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1055 (1997).   
127.  Lisa Spiwak, Forced Arbitration Violates Your Rights, PACIFIC COAST 
BUSINESS TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016), 
https://www.pacbiztimes.com/2016/01/15/forced-arbitration-violates-your-
rights/; U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
128.  Michael Peabody, Eliminating the Mandatory Trade-off: Should 
Employees Have the Right to Choose Arbitration?, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 107, 
108 (2000). 
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vein, in seeking employment, employees  have the right to waive 
their constitutional rights in order to secure employment.129 Thus, as 
a matter of public policy, it would be wise for a business to balance 
their exercise of constitutional rights alongside the rights of their 
employees to ensure a more equitable experience for both parties. 
Businesses should consider their position coming from a place of 
superior bargaining power and the ways in which this might affect 
contractual obligations between themselves and employees. 
G. Arbitration as a Corporate Employer Shield 
Another consideration for businesses when considering whether 
to include arbitration agreements in their employment contracts is 
the fact that for many years, arbitration has been used as a shield for 
abusive employer practices. Title VII claims will be used as a 
backdrop for the forthcoming analysis involving such abusive 
employer practices. Some scholars argue that mandatory arbitration 
may actually promulgate sexual harassment culture in the 
workplace, and the same could be likely said for discrimination 
culture, as this analysis will show, this tends to be the case.130 
 Our culture of constant connectivity means that most of the 
nation is now acquainted with a growing intolerance of workplace 
abuse, including sexual harassment in the wake of #MeToo. Such 
misconduct in the workplace setting is pervasive in the U.S. 
workplace, and in the past seven years alone, U.S. companies have 
paid near $300 million in public penalties resulting from sexual 
harassment claims brought by employees.131 Mandatory arbitration 
may undermine protective laws such as Title VII, the law forbidding 
sexual harassment in the workplace, by providing a shield from 
negative publicity for employers by allowing them to secretly pay 
out victims and brush harassment claims brought by employees.132 
This effect does little to develop case law around employment Title 
VII and discrimination claims, and instead allows businesses to 
continue abusive practices for years until forced to litigate publicly 
or until a victim breaks their settlement agreement.133 
The very nature of arbitration occurring in a private conference 
room rather than in a public court, as well as the financial difficulty 
of receiving arbitrators’ decisions, combined with secret settlements 
 
129.  Id.  
130.  Levinson, supra note 108, at 504. 
131.  Id. at 505; Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with 
EEOC) FY2010-FY2018, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2020), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm 
(Jan. 14, 2018).  
132.  Id. at 509. 
133.  Id. at 511; see also Estlund, supra note 84, at 680. 
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for victims of sexual harassment, showcases the need for a 
resolution that will strike a balance between protecting employer 
and employee interests.134 The “culture of secrecy” associated with 
arbitration is attributable to confidentiality norms occurring in the 
arbitration forum as well as amongst arbitrators.135 When utilizing 
mandatory arbitration, employers face limited “reputational 
sanctions,” which are often the most powerful deterrents to 
questionable misconduct for many large businesses and firms.136 
In order for businesses to be more ethically competent in the era 
of #MeToo and beyond, it is important that they be forthright in their 
mismanagement of misconduct and to display a sincere willingness 
to address toxic corporate culture. Recently, an uptick in the 
willingness to address decades-long patterns of toxicity has been 
evidenced, as businesses are increasingly striving towards effective 
resolutions of allegations of abuse.137 
H. Mandatory Employment Arbitration May Stifle Discrimination 
and Harassment Claims 
Next, this article examines how mandatory arbitration may stifle 
discrimination and harassment claims brought by employees, as 
well as what type of employees are most often affected by these 
agreements. Some critics view mandatory arbitration as less of an 
“alternative dispute resolution” device and more of a “disappearing 
 
134.  Estlund, supra note 84, at 680. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. at 681. 
137.  Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Munger Tolles, Orrick to Scrap Employee 
Arbitration Agreements, BLOOMBERG L.: BIG LAW BUS. (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://biglawbusiness.com/munger-tolles-orrick-to-scrap-employee-arbitration-
agreements; Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Google Scraps Mandatory Arbitration 
Agreements, SHRM (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-
law/pages/google-scraps-mandatory-arbitration-agreements.aspx; Laharee 
Chatterjee, Uber, Lyft Scrap Mandatory Arbitration for Sexual Assault Claims, 
THOMSON REUTERS: BUS. NEWS (May 15, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-sexual-harassment/uber-lyft-scrap-
mandatory-arbitration-for-sexual-assault-claims-idUSKCN1IG1I2.; Emily 
Canal, Microsoft Will No Longer Require Employees to Settle Sexual Harassment 
Cases Privately. Here’s Why It Matters for Your Company, INC. (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.inc.com/emily-canal/microsoft-forced-arbitration-sexual-
harassment.html; Davey Alba, et al., Square, Airbnb, and eBay Just Said They 
Would End Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment Claims, BUZZFEED NEWS 
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/tech-
companies-end-forced-arbitration-airbnb-ebay; Staci Zaretsky, The First Biglaw 
Firm to Willingly Do Away With Its Mandatory Arbitration Policy, ABOVE THE 
LAW, (May 17, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/03/this-biglaw-firm-is-the-
first-to-step-forward-and-do-away-with-mandatory-arbitration-for-all-
employees/. 
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act” as it relates to employees’ claims against their employers.138 
The secrecy and lack of transparency of many arbitration 
proceedings make it difficult to conduct empirical research on 
arbitration as it affects employees. 139  One empirical study by 
Alexander Colvin on employment arbitration showed a startlingly 
small number of arbitration filings. 140  It further found a strong 
repeat employer effect; where employee win rates and award 
amounts were lower where the arbitrator worked with the employer 
before. 141  The data demonstrates the procedural difficulties of 
arbitration, and potential inherent bias of repeat arbitrator-employer 
pairings, as the practice itself often has the effect of stymieing 
claims brought against employers, and reducing the damages 
awarded.142 
As to who is most often affected by arbitration agreements, 
notably more than half of private-sector non-union workers are 
subject to mandatory arbitration. 143  And while some employees 
signed these agreements as a prerequisite to hiring, other businesses 
adopted these arbitration procedures simply by announcing that 
these procedures had been incorporated into the organization’s 
employment policies. 144  As mentioned before, mandatory 
arbitration is found in many industries and is often implemented by 
large companies with many employees.145 A study by the Economic 
Policy Institute estimated that 57.6% of female workers are subject 
to mandatory arbitration, slightly higher than the rate for the overall 
population, or 56.2%.146  The study also estimated that 59.1% of 
African American workers in all industries of the United States are 
subject to mandatory arbitration, making African American workers 
the most likely to be subject to mandatory arbitration among all 
groups of workers identified. 147  Further, the EPI found that 
employers with the lowest-paid workforces were the most likely to 
impose mandatory arbitration.148 From a public policy standpoint, 
this is incredibly unsettling, in light of the fact that the low-paid 
work sector presents as a vulnerable segment of society, making 
 
138.  Estlund, supra note 84, at 682. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Alexander Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case 
Outcomes and Processes, Cornell Univ., ILR (last visited Oct. 12, 2019), 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/577. 
141.  Estlund, supra note 84, at 682.  
142.  Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4.  
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id. 
147.  Id. 
148.  Id.  
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them particularly susceptible to infringements on their employment 
rights.149  
Findings of gender and race-oriented arbitration outcomes 
should come as nothing short of disturbing. 150  In yet another 
empirical study conducted by Cornell University, researchers found 
that within the securities industry, the gender of both the 
complainant and the complainant’s attorney had significant negative 
effects on the size of the award.151 Female complainants and female 
complainant attorneys in arbitration proceedings generated less of 
an award than their male counterparts.152 With all of these factors in 
mind, as a matter of public policy it is absolutely pivotal for 
employers to reconsider how they approach disputes with their 
employees. Since the arbitration practice is already so prevalent and 
convenient for employers as discussed in part III, infra, it is unlikely 
that forced arbitration provisions will be disappearing anytime soon. 
However, as outlined below, we can begin to shift the paradigm and 
introduce best practices for businesses to incorporate for a more 
even-handed approach that will serve to protect the interests of 
employers and employees alike.  
IV. BEST PRACTICES FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS AS IT RELATES TO 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN THE EMPLOYMENT LAW CONTEXT 
In light of the business benefits and ethical drawbacks of 
including binding mandatory arbitration clauses in employment 
contracts, this Section recommends best practices for business and 
corporate lawyers to consider as they advise their clients and draft 
contracts.  
This Section presupposes that many employment contracts will 
include arbitration agreements, and thus prescribes some procedural 
and substantive mechanisms in order to make the contractual 
agreements fairer to all parties and enforceable, when necessary. 
There is a growing policy need to revise many employment 
arbitration agreements as they exist or implement more sound 
arbitration agreements if they are to continue being legal.153  
 
149.  Id; see Annette Benhardt, et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: 
Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, CTR. FOR URBAN 
ECON. DEV., EMP. L. PROJECT, & UCLA INSTIT. FOR RES. ON LAB. & EMP. (2009), 
https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf. 
150.  David Lipsky, et al., The Effect of Gender on Awards in Employment 
Arbitration Cases: The Experience in the Securities Industry, 52 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 1, 2 (2013). 
151.  Id. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Sen. Al Franken and Rep. Hank Johnson Lead Fight to End Unfair 
Forced Arbitration Agreements, Press Release, HANK JOHNSON CONGRESSMAN 
FOR GEORGIA’S 4TH DISTRICT (May 7, 2017), 
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Hank Johnson, the sponsor of the 2008 and 2009 versions of the 
Arbitration Fairness Act, stated that “big business has . . . warped 
and corrupted the arbitration process.” 154  And this may be an 
accurate characterization in light of the scope of employment 
arbitration and the historical pattern of enforceability. 
In an effort to preserve some of the business benefits of 
arbitration as discussed above, it is imperative for businesses and 
their attorneys to change the way that arbitration agreements are 
structured, in order for them to be conscionable, as well as ethically 
fair to the large class of employees these agreements are enforceable 
against. 
 In the words of Linda Sanchez, the Chair of the House 
Commercial and Administrative Law Subcommittee of the Judiciary 
Committee, “[t]o be a respected and reasonable alternative to the 
courts, arbitration must provide a level and fair playing field.”155 If 
implemented, arbitration should aim to provide faster, more 
effective remedies for employees. 156   Arbitration, when used 
correctly, should also allow the employee’s claim to be decided on 
the legal merits, rather than being dismissed preemptively on a 
motion by the employer’s lawyer before trial.157 
A. Ensure that Employees Understand the Legal Effect of 
Arbitration Clauses 
The first best practice is to ensure that employees understand the 
practical and legal consequences of signing an arbitration 
agreement. An employer might not be able to compel arbitration of 
an employment dispute if there is no valid assent to the 
arbitration.158  Assent is one of the fundamental elements of any 
contract agreement. While each arbitration agreement will be 
different depending on the company and the attorney drafting the 
clause, it is worth the few minutes and extra explanatory 
documentation given to the employee for them to understand what 
rights they may be relinquishing by signing the agreement. This is 
especially poignant because many arbitration agreements will be 
enforceable under the FAA even if they are not signed.159 
 
https://hankjohnson.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/sen-al-franken-and-
rep-hank-johnson-lead-fight-end-unfair-forced (include short history of AFA’s 
legislative history). 
154.  Stacy Hickox, Article: Ensuring Enforceability and Fairness in The 
Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 101, 103 (2010). 
155.  Id. 
156.  Id. at 108. 
157.  Id. 
158.  Id. at 109. 
159.  Id. at 110; Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 974 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
26
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 41 [2020], Art. 6
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol41/iss2/6
Spring Issue 2020] Gifford 103 
Corporate legal counsel should thoroughly train hiring managers 
how to fully explain the intricacies of their arbitration agreements to 
employees before the employees sign the employment contract. It is 
recommended that the employee be given a copy of the arbitration 
agreement as well as additional documentation that explains in plain 
language what the effects of this agreement will be upon any future 
disputes between the employee and the company.  
B. Include Opt-Out Provisions 
Business attorneys drafting these contracts on behalf of 
employers may also want to consider drafting opt-out provisions, 
which allow the employees to continue working at the company 
despite having opted out of an arbitration agreement. Another type 
of opt-out provision could give the employee the option, for a 
contractually agreed period of time, to opt-out of arbitration after 
originally “opting-in.”  
The large tech company, Uber, utilizes opt-out provisions in 
their arbitration agreements and has seen success in ensuing 
litigation as a result.160 Opt-out provisions may mitigate the unequal 
bargaining power concerns discussed above and promote 
enforceability of the contract where necessary.161 In Suarez v. Uber 
Techs, Inc., the court granted Uber’s motion to compel arbitration in 
an employment dispute which involved a ‘click-through’ service 
agreement and an opt-out arbitration provision.162 
The opt-out provision crafted by Uber emphasized that 
arbitration is an important business decision and that the employee 
should not rely solely on the information in the agreement in order 
to understand the consequences of arbitration.163 
As a matter of law, the Suarez court held that there was no 
procedural unconscionability because the plaintiffs had the absolute 
right to opt-out of the arbitration provision of the agreement.164 The 
court reasoned that even though the plaintiffs had less bargaining 
power, the plaintiffs would also be allowed to reject the arbitration 
 
160.  Suarez v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59421, *5 (M.D. Fla. 
May 4, 2016).  
161.  Id.; see also Brian Berkley, Can Opt-Out Provisions Save Arbitration 
Clauses?, LAW360 (June 8, 2016), 
https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=2e983dc4-6c43-
4df7-b94b-
0d909c3c6dd0&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fanalytical-
materials%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5JYN-V8S1-DXHD-G53T-00000-
00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A5JYN-V8S1-DXHD-G53T-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=122100&pdteaserkey=sr5&pditab=allpods&ecomp
=wpnqk&earg=sr5&prid=e43857c4-b9dd-4121-bbdd-2035dcd3494c&cbc=0. 
162.  Suarez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59421, at *1. 
163.  Id. at *5. 
164.  Id. at *12. 
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provision with no consequence to the relationship with the 
corporation.165 
Uber also required that the Uber drivers digitally confirm that 
they read the arbitration agreement not once, but twice. 166  This 
confirmation is especially poignant in the tech-age, encouraging 
employees to understand that they may opt out of these provisions 
and to not speed through the agreement process, especially when the 
signatures are electronic. This is key in light of the fact that an opt-
out provision alone, which may be inconspicuous, will not always 
save an arbitration agreement from being ruled unconscionable.167 
C. Consider Excluding Certain Claims Subject to Mandatory 
Arbitration 
In light of the policy discussions made earlier, when drafting 
binding mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts, 
business attorneys may want to consider careful drafting and 
consider excluding certain claims from binding arbitration.  
In light of recent National Labor Relations Board decisions, 
drafters should be sure that they don’t include language that may 
interfere with employees’ rights to place complaints with the 
NLRB. 168  Doing so will likely render the arbitration provision 
unenforceable as unlawfully interfering with employees’ rights. 
Along with this consideration, drafters of arbitration clauses 
might consider excluding claims of sexual harassment and sexual 
assault from binding arbitration, as a policy consideration in the 
light of the #MeToo movement.169 In the era of #MeToo, many 
companies are facing criticism where they compel claims of sexual 
harassment into private arbitration.170 Companies have announced 
that they will no longer compel arbitration of these claims, and 
ethically this seems to be the smartest move for businesses in terms 
of policy and public relations.171 While many courts may maintain 
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166.  Berkley, supra note 161. 
167.  Hickox, supra note 154, at 102–174. 
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that sexual harassment and assault claims remain arbitrable under 
the law and the broad breadth of the FAA, as a matter of policy, 
business lawyers should consider this exclusion.172 
V. CONCLUSION 
Given the current legal environment in the U.S., the status of the 
Supreme Court’s holdings on mandatory arbitration in employment 
law, and the current make-up of the current Supreme Court, it is no 
surprise that so many large businesses are utilizing employment 
arbitration.  
A 2008 survey of corporate counsel performed by Fulbright and 
Jaworski found that out of the 251 corporate participants in the U.S., 
75% had company-mandated arbitration of employment disputes in 
a non-union setting.173 The EPI recently reported that 56% of non-
union private-sector employees are currently held to mandatory 
individual arbitration procedures. 174   Industries implementing 
mandatory arbitration include: education, healthcare, business 
services, information, and retail. As a general rule, the more 
employees a corporation has, the more likely it is to use mandatory 
arbitration.175 
Businesses are keen to understand that there is “safety in 
numbers.” The current trend of employers requiring mandatory 
arbitration has resulted in an industry-wide domino effect, 
influencing others to follow suit. 176  Survey data from EPI 
demonstrates that among large employers who require mandatory 
arbitration, they have only started adopting it as readily within the 
last five years. 177  In fact, 43.5% of these large establishments 
surveyed, with over 100 employees, have adopted binding 
mandatory arbitration within the last five years. At least in the U.S., 
the more employees a corporation has, the higher likelihood of 
mandatory arbitration is utilized. 178  Sixty seven percent of the 
companies surveyed by the EPI in the U.S. workplace, who had over 
5,000 employees, hold those employees to mandatory arbitration 
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procedures. 179  The EPI attributes these numbers to the fact that 
larger organizations have more sophisticated human resource 
policies and better legal counsel and are more likely to adopt 
mandatory arbitration in order to better shield themselves against 
legal liability.180 
Considering the rise of arbitration usage in the employment law 
context, employers and their attorneys must understand how to 
ethically and effectively utilize alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms to resolve employment disputes. Business benefits, as 
well as potential ethical drawbacks of utilizing binding arbitration 
in the workplace should be weighed and allocated differently 
depending on the size of the business, the scope of the business, and 
the type of employee relationships it utilizes.  
It is becoming increasingly important for businesses to be 
transparent and publicly responsible concerning their treatment of 
employees, so while utilizing arbitration may work efficiently for 
some claims, it may not always be the best solution for every claim 
an employee may bring. Employment arbitration continues to allow 
for quick, economical dispute resolution and when employed 
ethically and thoughtfully, will continue to be an efficient vehicle 
for employment dispute claims. 
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